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ABSTRACT
Whendata analysts operatewithin different statistical frameworks (e.g., frequentist versus Bayesian, empha-
sis on estimation versus emphasis on testing), how does this impact the qualitative conclusions that
are drawn for real data? To study this question empirically we selected from the literature two simple
scenarios—involving a comparison of two proportions and a Pearson correlation—and asked four teams of
statisticians toprovide a concise analysis andaqualitative interpretationof theoutcome. The results showed
considerable overall agreement; nevertheless, this agreementdidnot appear todiminish the intensity of the
subsequent debate over which statistical framework is more appropriate to address the questions at hand.
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1. Introduction
When analyzing a specific dataset, statisticians usually operate
within the confines of their preferred inferential paradigm. For
instance, frequentist statisticians interested in hypothesis testing
may report p-values, whereas those interested in estimation
may seek to draw conclusions from confidence intervals. In
the Bayesian realm, those who wish to test hypotheses may
use Bayes factors and those who wish to estimate parameters
may report credible intervals. And then there are likelihood-
ists, information-theorists, and machine-learners—there exists
a diverse collection of statistical approaches, many of which are
philosophically incompatible.
Moreover, proponents of the various camps regularly explain
why their position is the most exalted, either in practical or
theoretical terms. For instance, in a well-known article ‘Why
Isn’t Everyone a Bayesian?’, Bradley Efron claimed that “The
high ground of scientific objectivity has been seized by the
frequentists” (Efron 1986, p. 4), upon which Dennis Lindley
replied that “Every statisticianwould be a Bayesian if he took the
trouble to read the literature thoroughly and was honest enough
to admit that he might have been wrong” (Lindley 1986, p.
7). Similarly spirited debates occurred earlier, notably between
Fisher and Jeffreys (e.g., Howie 2002) and between Fisher and
Neyman. Even today, the paradigmatic debates show no sign of
stalling, neither in the published literature (e.g., Benjamin et al.
2018; McShane et al. in press; Wasserstein and Lazar 2016) nor
on social media.
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The question that concerns us here is purely pragmatic:
“does it matter?” In other words, will reasonable statistical
analyses on the same dataset, each conducted within their own
paradigm, result in qualitatively similar conclusions (Berger
2003)? One of the first to pose this question was Ronald
Fisher. In a letter to Harold Jeffreys, dated on March 29, 1934,
Fisher proposed that “From the point of view of interesting
the general scientific public, which really ought to be much
more interested than it is in the problem of inductive inference,
probably the most useful thing we could do would be to take
one or more specific puzzles and show what our respective
methods made of them” (Bennett 1990, p. 156; see also Howie
2002, p. 167). The two men then proceeded to construct
somewhat idiosyncratic statistical “puzzles” that the other
found difficult to solve. Nevertheless, three years and several
letters later, on May 18, 1937, Jeffreys stated that “Your letter
confirms my previous impression that it would only be once
in a blue moon that we would disagree about the inference to
be drawn in any particular case, and that in the exceptional
cases we would both be a bit doubtful” (Bennett 1990, p. 162).
Similarly, Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) suggested that
well-conducted experiments often satisfy Berkson’s interocular
traumatic test—“you know what the data mean when the
conclusion hits you between the eyes” (p. 217). Nevertheless,
surprisingly little is known about the extent to which, in
concrete scenarios, a data analyst’s statistical plumage affects
the inference.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
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Table 1. Variable names and their description.
Variable Description
Cetirizine exposure Whether exposed to cetirizine
Birth defect Whether birth defects were detected
Counts Count data for each cell
Here we revisit Fisher’s challenge. We invited four groups of
statisticians to analyze two real datasets, report and interpret
their results in about 300 words, and discuss these results and
interpretations in a round-table discussion. The datasets are
provided online at https://osf.io/hykmz/ and described below.
In addition to providing an empirical answer to the question
“does it matter?”, we hope to highlight how the same dataset can
give rise to rather different statistical treatments. In our opinion,
this method variability ought to be acknowledged rather than
ignored (for a complementary approach see Silberzahn et al. in
press).1
The selected datasets are straightforward: the first dataset
concerns a 2×2 contingency table, and the second concerns a
correlation between two variables. The simplicity of the statisti-
cal scenarios is on purpose, as we hoped to facilitate a detailed
discussion about assumptions and conclusions that could other-
wise have remained hidden underneath an unavoidable layer of
statistical sophistication. The full instructions for participation
can be found online at https://osf.io/dg9t7/.
2. DataSet I: Birth Defects and Cetirizine Exposure
2.1. Study Summary
Cetirizine is a nonsedating long-acting antihistaminewith some
mast-cell stabilizing activity. It is used for the symptomatic relief
of allergic conditions, such as rhinitis and urticaria, which are
common in pregnant women. In the study of interest, Weber-
Schoendorfer and Schaefer (2008) aimed to assess the safety of
cetirizine during the first trimester of pregnancy when used.
The pregnancy outcomes of a cetirizine group (n = 181) were
compared to those of the control group (n = 1685; pregnant
women who had been counseled during pregnancy about expo-
sures known to be nonteratogenic). Due to the observational
nature of the data, the allocation of participants to the groups
was nonrandomized. The main point of interest was the rate of
birth defects.2 Variables of the dataset3 are described in Table 1
and the data are presented in Table 2.
2.2. Cetirizine Research Question
Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associatedwith a higher
incidence of birth defects? In the next sections each of four data
analysis teams will attempt to address this question.
1 In contrast to the current approach, Silberzahn et al. (in press) used a
relatively complex dataset and did not emphasize the differences in inter-
pretation caused by the adoption of dissimilar statistical paradigms.
2 The original study focused on cetirizine-induced differences in major birth
defects, spontaneous abortions, andpretermdeliveries.Wedecided to look
at all birthdefects, because the sample sizeswere larger for this comparison
and we deemed the data more interesting.
3 The dataset is made available on the OSF repository: https://osf.io/hykmz/ .
Table 2. Cetirizine exposure and birth defects.
Birth defects
Cetirizine exposure No Yes Total
No 1588 97 1685
Yes 167 14 181
Total 1755 111 1866
2.3. Analysis and Interpretation by Lakens and Hennig
2.3.1. Preamble
Frequentist statistics is based on idealised models of data-
generating processes. We cannot expect these models to be
literally true in practice, but it is instructive to see whether
data are consistent with such models, which is what hypothesis
tests and confidence intervals allow us to examine. We do
appreciate that automatic procedures involving for example
fixed significance levels allow us to control error probabilities
assuming the model, but given that the models do never hold
precisely, and that there are often issues with measurement or
selection effects, in most cases we think it is prudent to interpret
outcomes in a coarse way rather than to read toomuchmeaning
into, say, differences between p-values of 0.047 and 0.062. We
stick to quite elementary methodology in our analyses.
2.3.2. Analysis and Software
Weperformed a Pearson’s chi-squared test with Yates’ continuity
correction to test for dependence between exposure of preg-
nant women exposed to cetirizine and birth defects using the
chisq.test function in R software version 3.4.3 (RDevelop-
ment Core Team 2004). However, becauseWeber-Schoendorfer
and Schaefer (2008) wanted “to assess the safety of cetirizine
during the first trimester of pregnancy,” their actual research
question is whether we can reject the presence of a meaningful
effect. We therefore performed an equivalence test on propor-
tions (Chen, Tsong, and Kang, 2000) as implemented in the
TOSTtwo.prop function in the TOSTERpackage (Lakens 2017).
2.3.3. Results and Interpretation
The chi-squared test yielded χ2(1,N = 1866) = 0.817, p = 0.366,
which suggests that the data are consistent with an indepen-
dence model at any significance level in general use. The answer
to the question whether the drug is safe depends on a smallest
effect size of interest (when is the difference in birth defects
considered too small to matter?). This choice, and the selection
of equivalence boundsmore generally, should always be justified
by clinical and statistical considerations pertinent to the case
at hand. In the absence of a discussion of this essential aspect
of the study by the authors, and in order to show an example
computation, we will test against a difference in proportions of
10%,which, although debatable, has been suggested as a sensible
bound for some drugs (see Röhmel 2001, for a discussion).
An equivalence test against a difference in proportions
(Mdif = 0.02, 95% CI[−0.02; 0.06]) of 10% based on Fisher’s
exact z-test was significant, z = −3.88, p < 0.001. This means
that we can reject differences in proportions as large, or larger,
than 10%, again at any significance level in general use.
Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associated with a
higher incidence of birth defects? Based on the current study,
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Figure 1. Estimates of the odds of a birth defect when no cetirizine (control) was taken during pregnancy and when cetirizine was taken. Horizontal dashed lines and
shaded regions show point estimates and standard errors. The solid line labeled “Cetirizine worst case” shows the upper bound of the one-sided CI as a function of the
confidence coefficient (x-axis). The right axis shows the estimated increase in odds of a birth defect for the cetirizine group compared to the control group.
there is no evidence that cetirizine exposure during pregnancy
is associated with a higher incidence of birth defects. Obviously,
this does not mean that cetirizine is safe; in fact the observed
birth defect rate in the cetirizine group is about 2% higher
than without exposure, which may or may not be explained
by random variation. Is cetirizine during the first trimester of
pregnancy “safe”? If we accept a difference in the proportion of
birth defects of 10%, and desire a 5% long run error rate, there
is clear evidence that the drug is safe. However, we expect that
a cost–benefit analysis would suggest proportions of 5% to be
unacceptably high, which is in the 95% confidence interval and
therefore well compatible with the data. Therefore, we would
personally consider the current data inconclusive.
2.4. Analysis and Interpretation byMorey and Homer
Fitting a classical logistic model with the binary birth defect
outcome predicted from the cetirizine indicator confirmed the
nonsignificant relationship (p = 0.287). The point estimate of
the effect of taking cetirizine is to increase the odds of the birth
defect by only 37%. At the baseline levels of birth defects in the
non-cetirizine-exposed sample (approximately 6%), this would
amount to about an extra two birth defects in every hundred
pregnancies in the cetirizine-exposed group.
There are several problemswith taking these data as evidence
that cetirizine is safe. The first is the observational nature of the
data. We have no way of knowing whether an apparent effect—
or lack of effect—reflects confounds. Suppose, though, that we
set this question aside and assess the evidence that birth defects
are not more common in the cetirizine group. We can use a
classical one-sided CI to determine the size of the differences
we can rule out. We call the upper bound of the 100(1−α)% CI
the “worst case” for that confidence coefficient. Figure 1 shows
that at 95%, the worst-case odds increase is for the cetirizine
group is 124%. At 99.5%, the worst case increase is 195%. We
can translate this into more a more intuitive metric of numbers
of birth defects: at baseline rates of birth defects, these would
amount to additional 6 and 10 birth defects per 100, respectively
(Figure 2).
The large p-value of the initial significance test suggests that
we cannot rule out that cetirizine group has lower rates of birth
defects; the one-sided test assuming a decrease in birth defects
as the null would not yield a rejection except at high α levels. But
also, the “worst-case” analysis using the upper bound of the one-
sided CI suggests we also cannot rule out a substantial increase
in birth defects in the cetirizine group.
We are unsure whether cetirizine is safe, but it seems clear
to us that these data do not provide much evidence of its rela-
tive safety, contrary to what Weber-Schoendorfer and Schaefer
suggest.
2.5. Analysis and Interpretation by Gronau, van Doorn,
andWagenmakers
We used the model proposed by Kass and Vaidyanathan (1992):
log
(
p1
1 − p1
)
= β − ψ
2
,
log
(
p2
1 − p2
)
= β + ψ
2
,
y1 ∼ Binomial(n1, p1),
y2 ∼ Binomial(n2, p2).
(1)
Here, y1 = 97, n1 = 1, 685, y2 = 14, and n2 = 181, p1 is the
probability of a birth defect in the control group, and p2 is that
probability in the cetirizine group. Probabilities p1 and p2 are
functions of model parameters β and ψ . Nuisance parameter
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Figure 2. Frequency representations of the number of birth defects expected under various scenarios. Top: Expected frequency of birth defects when cetirizine was not
taken (control). Bottom-left: Point estimate of the expected frequency of birth defects when cetirizine is taken. Bottom-middle (bottom-right): Upper bound of a one-
sided 95% (99%) CI for the expected frequency of birth defects when cetirizine was taken. Because the analysis is intended to be comparative, in the bottom panels the
no-cetirizine estimate was assumed to be the truth when calculating the increase in frequency.
β corresponds to the grand mean of the log odds, whereas the
test-relevant parameterψ corresponds to the log odds ratio. We
assigned β a standard normal prior and used a zero-centred
normal prior with standard deviation σ for the log odds ratioψ .
Inference was conductedwithStan (Carpenter et al. 2017; Stan
DevelopmentTeam2016) and thebridgesamplingpackage
(Gronau, Singmann, and Wagenmakers in press). For ease of
interpretation, the results will be shown on the odds ratio scale.
Our first analysis focuses on estimation and uses σ = 1.
The result, shown in the left panel of Figure 3, indicates that
the posterior median equals 1.429, with a 95% credible interval
ranging from 0.793 to 2.412. This credible interval is relatively
wide, indicating substantial uncertainty about the true value of
the odds ratio.
Our second analysis focuses on testing and quantifies the
extent to which the data support the skeptic’s H0 : ψ = 0
versus the proponent’s H1. To specify H1 we initially use σ =
0.4 (i.e., a mildly informative prior; Diamond and Kaul 2004),
truncated at zero to respect the fact that cetirizine exposure is
hypothesized to cause a higher incidence of birth defects: H+ :
ψ ∼ N+(0, 0.42).
As can be seen from the right panel of Figure 3, the observed
data are predicted about 1.8 times better by H+ than by H0.
According to Jeffreys (1961, Appendix B), this level of support
is “not worth more than a bare mention.” To investigate the
robustness of this result, we explored a range of alternative prior
choices for σ under H+, varying it from 0.01 to 2. The results
of this sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 4 and reveal that
across a wide range of priors, the data never provide more than
anecdotal support for one model over the other. When σ is
selected post hoc to maximize the support for H+ this yields
BF+0 = 1.84, which, starting from a position of equipoise, raises
the probability ofH+ from0.50 to about 0.65, leaving a posterior
probability of 0.35 forH0.
In sum, based on this dataset we cannot draw strong con-
clusions about whether or not cetirizine exposure during preg-
nancy is associated with a higher incidence of birth defects.
Our analysis shows an “absence of evidence,” not “evidence for
absence.”
2.6. Analysis and interpretation by Gelman
I summarized the datawith a simple comparison: the proportion
of birth defects is 0.06 in the control group and 0.08 in the
cetirizine group. The difference is 0.02 with a standard error of
0.02. I got essentially the same result with a logistic regression
predicting birth defect: the coefficient of cetirizine is 0.3 with
a standard error of 0.3. I performed the analyses in R using
rstanarm (code available at https://osf.io/nh4gc/).
I then looked up the article, “The safety of cetirizine dur-
ing pregnancy: A prospective observational cohort study,” by
Weber-Schoendorfer and Schaefer (2008) and noticed some
interesting things:
(a) The published article gives N = 196 and 1686 for the
two groups, not quite the same as the 181 and 1685 for
the “all birth defects” category. I could not follow the exact
reasoning.4
(b) The two groups differ in various background variables:
most notably, the cetirizine group has a higher smoking
rate (17% compared to 10%).
4 Clarification: the original article does not provide a rationale forwhy several
participants were excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 3. Gronau, van Doorn, and Wagenmakers’ Bayesian analysis of the cetirizine dataset. The left panel shows the results of estimating the log odds ratio underH1
with a two-sided standard normal prior. For ease of interpretation, results are displayed in the odds ratio scale. The right panel shows the results of testing the one-sided
alternative hypothesisH+ : ψ ∼ N+(0, 0.42) versus the null hypothesisH0 : ψ = 0. Figures inspired by JASP (jasp-stats.org).
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
1/10
1/3
1
3
10
Anecdotal
Moderate
Anecdotal
Moderate
EvidenceB
F +
0
σ
Evidence for H+
Evidence for H0
max BF+0 :
user prior: BF+0 = 1.808
1.841 at σ = 0.356
Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis for the Bayesian one-sided test. The Bayes factor BF+0 is a function of the prior standard deviation σ . Figure inspired by JASP.
(c) In the published article, the outcome of focus was “major
birth defects,” not the “all birth defects” given for us to
study.
(d) The published article has a causal aim (as can be seen, for
example, from the word “safety” in its title); our assign-
ment is purely observational.
Now the question, “Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy
associated with a higher incidence of birth defects?” I have not
read the literature on the topic. To understand how the data at
hand address this question, I would like to think of the mapping
fromprior to posterior distribution. In this case, the prior would
be the distribution of association with birth defects of all drugs
of this sort. That is, imagine a population of drugs, j = 1, 2, . . . ,
taken by pregnant women, and for each drug, define θj as the
proportion of birth defects among women who took drug j,
minus the proportion of birth defects in the general popula-
tion. Just based on my general understanding (which could be
wrong), I would expect this distribution to be more positive
than negative and concentrated near zero: some drugs could
be mildly protective against birth defects or associated with
low-risk pregnancies, most would have small effects and not
be strongly associated with low- or high-risk pregnancies, and
some could cause birth defects or be taken disproportionately
by women with high-risk pregnancies. Supposing that the prior
is concentrated within the range (−0.01,+0.01), the data would
not add much information to this prior.
To answer, “Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associ-
ated with a higher incidence of birth defects?,” the key question
would seem to be whether the drug is more or less likely to be
taken by women at a higher risk of birth defects. I am guessing
that maternal age is a big predictor here. In the reported study,
average age of the exposed and control groups was the same, but
I do not know if that is generally the case or if the designers of
the study were purposely seeking a balanced comparison.
3. DataSet II: Amygdalar Activity and Perceived Stress
3.1. Study Summary
In a recent study published in the Lancet, Tawakol et al. (2017)
tested the hypothesis that perceived stress is positively associ-
ated with resting activity in the amygdala. In the second study
reported in Tawakol et al. (2017), n = 13 individuals with
an increased burden of chronic stress (i.e., a history of post-
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Table 3. Variable names and their description.
Variable Description
Perceived stress scale Participant score on the PSS
Amygdalar activity Intensity of amygdalar resting state activity
Table 4. Raw data as extracted from Figure 5 in Tawakol et al. (2017), with help of
Jurgen Rusch, Philips Research Eindhoven.
Perceived Amygdalar
Stress Scale Activity
12.0103 5.2418
32.0350 6.8601
22.0296 6.4402
20.0079 5.4620
24.0155 5.4439
24.0155 5.3349
24.0155 5.4216
26.0082 5.5176
28.0120 5.1615
21.9872 4.7114
21.9872 4.1844
20.0138 4.3079
16.0088 3.3015
Figure 5. Scatterplot of amygdalar activity and perceived stress in 13 patients with
PTSD. Data extracted from Figure 5 in Tawakol et al. (2017), with help of Jurgen
Rusch, Philips Research Eindhoven.
traumatic stress disorder or PTSD) were recruited from the
community, completed a Perceived Stress Scale (i.e., the PSS-10;
Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermelstein 1983) and had their amyg-
dalar activity measured. Variables of the dataset5 are described
in Table 3, the raw data are presented in Table 4, and the data are
visualized in Figure 5.
3.2. Amygdala Research Question
Do PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar activity
experience more stress? In the next sections each of four data
analysis teams will attempt to address this question.
5 The dataset is made available on the OSF repository: https://osf.io/hykmz/ .
3.3. Analysis and Interpretation by Lakens and Hennig
3.3.1. Analysis and Software
We calculated tests for uncorrelatedness based on both Pearson’s
product-moment correlation and Spearman’s rank correlation
using the cor.test function in the stats package in R 3.4.3.
3.3.2. Results and interpretation
The Pearson correlation between perceived stress and resting
activity in the amygdala is r = 0.555, and the corresponding
test yields p = 0.047. Although this is just smaller than the
conventional 5% level, we do not consider it as clear evidence for
nonzero correlation. From the appendix it becomes clear that
the reported correlations are exploratory: “Patients completed
a battery of self-report measures that assessed variables that
may correlatewith PTSD symptom severity, including comorbid
depressive and anxiety symptoms (MADRS,HAMA) and awell-
validated questionnaire Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10).” There-
fore, corrections for multiple comparisons would be required to
maintain a given significance level. The article does not provide
us with sufficient information to determine the number of tests
that were performed, but corrections for multiple comparisons
would thus be in order. Consequently, the fairly large observed
correlation and the borderline significant p-value can be inter-
preted as an indication that it may be worthwhile to investigate
the issue with a larger sample size, but do not give conclusive
evidence. Visual inspection of the data does not give any indica-
tion against the validity of using Pearson’s correlation, but with
N = 13 we do not have very strong information regarding the
distributional shape. The analogous test based on Spearman’s
correlation yields p = 0.062, which given its weaker power is
compatible with the qualitative interpretation we gave based on
the Pearson correlation.
Do PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar activity
experience more stress? Based on the current study, we cannot
conclude that PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar
activity experience more stress. The single p = 0.047 is not low
enough to indicate clear evidence against the null hypothesis
after correcting for multiple comparisons when using an alpha
of 0.05. Therefore, our conclusion is: Based on the desired error
rate specified by the authors, we cannot reject a correlation of
zero between amygdalar activity and participants’ score on the
perceived stress scale. With a 95% CI that ranges from r = 0
to r = 0.85, it seems clear that effects that would be considered
interesting cannot be rejected in an equivalence test. Thus, the
results are inconclusive.
3.4. Analysis and Interpretation byMorey and Homer
The first thing that should be noted about this dataset is that
it contains a meager 13 data points. The linear correlation by
Tawakol et al. (2017) depends on assumptions that are for all
intents and purposes unverifiable with this few participants.
Add to this the difficulty of interpreting the independent
variable—a sum of ordinal responses—and we are justified
being skeptical of any hard conclusions from these data.
Suppose, however, that the relationship between these two
variables was best characterized by a linear correlation, and
set aside any worries about assumptions. The large observed
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Figure 6. Confidence intervals and one-sided tests for the Pearson correlation as a
function of the confidence coefficient. The vertical lines represent the confidence
intervals (confidence coefficient on lower axis), and the curve represents the value
that is just rejected by the one-sided test (α on the upper axis).
correlation coupled with the marginal p-value should signal to
us that a wide range of correlations are not ruled out by the
data. Consider that the 95% CI on the Pearson correlation is
[0.009,0.848]; the 99.5% CI is [−0.254,0.908]. Negligible cor-
relations are not ruled out; due to the small sample size, any
correlation from “essentially zero” to “the correlation between
height and leg length” (i.e., very high) is consistent with these
data. The solid curve in Figure 6 shows the lower bound of the
confidence interval on the linear correlation for a wide range of
confidence levels; they are all negligible or even negative.
Finally, the authors did not show that this correlation is
selective to the amygdala; it seems to us that interpreting the
correlation as evidence for their model requires selectivity. It
is important to interpret the correlation in the context of the
relationship between amygdala resting state activity, stress, and
cardiovascular disease. If one could not show that amygdala
resting-state activation showed a substantially higher correla-
tion with stress than other brain regions not implicated in the
model, this would suggest that the correlation cannot be used to
bolster their case. Given the uncertainty in the estimate of the
correlation, there is little chance of being able to show this.
All in all, we are not sure that the information in these
thirteen participants is enough to say anything beyond “the
correlation doesn’t appear to be (very) negative.”
3.5. Analysis and Interpretation by VanDoorn, Gronau,
andWagenmakers
We applied Harold Jeffreys’s test for a Pearson correlation coef-
ficient ρ (Jeffreys 1961; Ly, Marsman, and Wagenmakers 2018)
as implemented in JASP (jasp-stats.org; JASP Team 2018).6 Our
first analysis focuses on estimation and assignsρ a uniformprior
from −1 to 1. The result, shown in the left panel of Figure 7,
indicates that the posterior median equals 0.47, with a 95%
credible interval ranging from−0.01 to 0.81. As can be expected
with only 13 observations, there is great uncertainty about the
size of ρ.
6 JASP is an open-source statistical software program with a graphical user
interface that supports both frequentist and Bayesian analyses.
Our second analysis focuses on testing and quantifies the
extent to which the data support the skeptic’sH0 : ρ = 0 versus
the proponent’s H1. To specify H1, we initially use Jeffreys’s
default uniform distribution, truncated at zero to respect the
directionality of the hypothesized effect:H+ : ρ ∼ U[0, 1].
As can be seen from the right panel of Figure 7, the observed
data are predicted about 3.9 times better by H+ than by H0.
This degree of support is relativelymodest: whenH+ andH0 are
equally likely a priori, the Bayes factor of 3.9 raises the posterior
plausibility ofH+ from 0.50 to 0.80, leaving a nonnegligible 0.20
forH0.
To investigate the robustness of this result, we explored a
continuous range of alternative prior distributions for ρ under
H+; specifically, we assignedρ a stretchedBeta(a,a) distribution
truncated at zero, and studied how the Bayes factor changes with
1/a, the parameter that quantifies the prior width and governs
the extent to whichH+ predicts large values of r. The results of
this sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 8 and confirm that
the data provide modest support for H+ across a wide range
of priors. When the precision is selected post hoc to maximize
the support for H+ this yields BF+0 = 4.35, which—under a
position of equipose– raises the plausibility ofH+ from 0.50 to
about 0.81, leaving a posterior probability of 0.19 forH0.
A similar sensitivity analysis could be conducted for H0 by
assuming a “perinull” (Tukey 1995, p. 8)—a distribution tightly
centered around ρ = 0 rather than a point mass on ρ = 0. The
results will be qualitatively similar.
In sum, the claim that “PTSD patients with high resting state
amygdalar activity experience more stress” receives modest but
not compelling support from the data.” The 13 observations do
not warrant categorical statements, neither about the presence
nor about the strength of the hypothesized effect.
3.6. Analysis and interpretation by Gelman
I summarized the data with a simple scatterplot and a linear
regression of logarithm of perceived stress on logarithm of
amygdalar activity, using log scales because the data were all-
positive and it seemed reasonable tomodel amultiplicative rela-
tion. The scatterplot revealed a positive correlation and no other
striking patterns, and the regression coefficient was estimated
at 0.6 with a standard error of 0.4. I performed the analyses in
R using rstanarm (code available at https://osf.io/nh4gc/). and
the standard error is based on the median absolute deviation of
posterior simulations (see help(“mad”) in R for more on this).
I then looked up the article, “Relation between resting
amygdalar activity and cardiovascular events: a longitudinal and
cohort study,” by Tawakol et al. (2017). The goal of the research
is “to determine whether [the amygdala’s] resting metabolic
activity predicts risk of subsequent cardiovascular events.” Here
are some items relevant to our current task:
(a) Perceived stress is an intermediate outcome, not the ulti-
mate goal of the study.
(b) Any correlation or predictive relation will depend on the
reference population. The people in this particular study
are “individuals with a history of posttraumatic stress
disorder” living in the Boston area.
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Figure 7. van Doorn, Gronau, and Wagenmakers’ Bayesian analysis of the amygdala dataset. The left panel shows the result of estimating the Pearson correlation
coefficient ρ under H1 with a two-sided uniform prior. The right panel shows the result of testing H0 : ρ = 0 versus the one-sided alternative hypothesis H+ :
ρ ∼ U[0, 1]. Figures from JASP.
Figure 8. Sensitivity analysis for the Bayesian one-sided correlation test. The Bayes
factor BF+0 is a function of the prior width parameter 1/a from the stretched
Beta(a,a) distribution. Figure from JASP.
(c) The published article reports that “Perceived stress was
associated with amygdalar activity (r = 0.56; p =
0.0485).” Performing the correlation (or, equivalently, the
regression) on the log scale, the result is not statistically
significant at the 5% level. This is no big deal given that I
do not think that it makes sense to make decisions based
on a statistical significance threshold, but it is relevant
when considering scientific communication.
(d) Comparing my log-scale scatterplot to the raw-scale scat-
terplot (Figure 5A in the published article), I would say
that the unlogged scatterplot looks cleaner, with the points
more symmetrically distributed. Indeed, based on these
data alone, I would move to an unlogged analysis–that is,
the estimated correlation of 0.56 reported in the article.
To address the question, “Do PTSDpatients with high resting
state amygdalar activity experience more stress?,” we need two
additional decisions or pieces of information. First, we must
decide the population of interest; here there is a challenge in
extrapolating from people with PTSD to the general popula-
tion. Second, we need a prior distribution for the correlation
being estimated. It is difficult for me to address either of these
issues: as a statistician my contribution would be to map from
assumptions to conclusions. In this case, the assumptions about
the prior distribution and the assumptions about extrapolation
go together, as in both cases we need some sense of how likely it
is to see large correlations between the responses to a subjective
stress survey and a biomeasurement such as amygdalar activity.
It could well be that there is a prior expectation of positive corre-
lation between these two variables in the general population, but
that the current data do not provide much information beyond
our prior for this general question.
4. Round-Table Discussion
As described above, the two datasets have each been analyzed
by four teams. The different approaches and conclusions are
summarized in Table 5. The discussion was carried out via
E-mail and a transcript can be found online at https://osf.io/
f4z7x/. Below we highlight and summarize the central elements
of a discussion that quickly proceeded from the data analysis
techniques in the concrete case to more fundamental philo-
sophical issues. Given the relative agreement among the con-
clusions reached by different methodological angles, our dis-
cussion started out with the following deliberately provocative
statement:
In statistics, it doesn’t matter what approach is used. As long
as you do conduct your analysis with care, you will invariably
arrive at the same qualitative conclusion.7
In agreement with this claim, Hennig stated that “we all seem
to have a healthy skepticism about the models that we are using.
This probably contributes strongly to the fact that all our final
interpretations by and large agree. Ultimately our conclusions
all state that “the data are inconclusive.” I think the important
point here is that we all treat our models as tools for thinking
that can only do so much, and of which the limitations need to
7 The statement is based on Jeffreys’ claims “[a]s a matter of fact I have
appliedmy significance tests to numerous applications that have also been
workedout by Fisher’s, andhave not yet found adisagreement in the actual
decisions reached” (Jeffreys 1939, p. 365) and “it would only be once in a
bluemoon thatwe [Fisher and Jeffreys]woulddisagree about the inference
to be drawn in any particular case, and that in the exceptional cases we
would both be a bit doubtful” (Bennett 1990, p. 162).
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Table 5. Overview of the approaches and results of the research teams.
Research team DataSet I: Cetirizine and birth defects DataSet II:Amygdalar Activity
Lakens and Hennig
• Frequentist test of equivalence
• 10% equivalence region
• Data deemed inconclusive
• Frequentist correlation, p = .047
• Concerns about multiple comparisons
• Data deemed inconclusive
Morey and Homer
• Frequentist logistic model, p = .287
• Observational, so possible confounds
• Data deemed inconclusive
• Frequentist correlation, p = .047
• Small nmeans assumptions unverifiable
• Is the effect specific for amygdala?
• Data deemed inconclusive
Gronau, Van Doorn, and
Wagenmakers
• Default Bayes factor BF01 = 1.6
• Evidence “not worth more than a bare mention”
• Data deemed inconclusive
• Default Bayes factor BF10 = 2
• Small n
• Data deemed inconclusive
Gelman
• Bayesian analysis needs good prior
• Data likely to be inconclusive
• A key question is who takes the drug in the population
• Bayesian analysis needs good prior
• Problems with generalizing to population
• Data likely to be inconclusive
be explored, rather than ‘believing in’ our relying on any specific
model (Email 29).On the other hand,Hennigwonders “whether
differences between us would’ve been more pronounced with
data that wouldn’t have allowed us to sit on the fence that easily”
(Email 29) and Lakens wonders “about what would have hap-
pened if the data were clearer” (Email 32). In addition, Morey
points out that “none of us had anything invested in these ques-
tions, whereas almost always analyses are published by people
who are most invested” (Email 33).Wagenmakers responds that
we [referring to the group that organized this study] wanted to
use simple problems that would not pose immediate problems
for either one of the paradigms...[and] we tried to avoid data sets
that met Berkson’s ‘inter-ocular traumatic test’ (when the data
are so clear that the conclusion hits you right between the eyes)
where we would immediately agree. (Email 31).
Moreover, the focus was on the analyses and discussion as
free as possible from other consideration (e.g., personal invest-
ment in the questions).
However, differences between the analyses were emphasized
as well. First, Morey argued that the differences (e.g., research
planning, execution, analysis, etc.) between the Bayesian and
frequentist approach are critically important and not easily
inter-translatable (Email 2). This gave rise to an extended
discussion about the frequentist procedures’ dependence of
the sampling protocol, which Bayesian procedures lack. While
Bayesians such as Wagenmakers see this as a critical objection
against the coherent use of frequentist procedures (e.g., in
cases where the sampling protocol is uncertain), Hennig
contends that one can still interpret the p-value as indicating
the compatibility of the data with the null model, assuming
a hypothetical sampling plan (see Email 5–11, 16–18, 23,
and 24). Second, Lakens speculated that, in the cases where
the approaches differ, there “might be more variation within
specific approaches, than between” (Email 1). Third, Hennig
pointed out that differences in prior specifications could lead to
discrepancies between Bayesians (Email 4) and Homer pointed
out that differences in alpha decision boundaries could lead
to discrepancies between frequentists’ conclusions (Email 11).
Finally, Gelman disagreed with most of what had been said in
the discussion thus far. Specifically, he said: “I don’t think ‘alpha’
makes any sense, I don’t think 95% intervals are generally a good
idea, I don’t think it’s necessarily true that points in 95% interval
are compatible with the data, etc etc.” (Email 15).
A concrete issue concerned the equivalence test used by
Lakens and Hennig for the first dataset. Wagenmakers objects
that it does not add relevant information to the presentation of
a confidence interval (Email 12). Lakens responds that it allows
to reject the hypothesis of a >10% difference in proportions
at almost any alpha level, thereby avoiding reliance on default
alpha levels, which are often used in amindless way and without
attention to the particular case (Email 13).
A more foundational point of contention with the two
datasets and their analysis was about the question of how to
formulate Bayesian priors. For these concrete cases, Hennig
contends that the subject-matter information cannot be
smoothly translated into prior specifications (Email 27), which
is the reason why Morey and Homer choose a frequentist
approach, while Gelman considers it “hard for me to imagine
how to answer the questions without thinking about subject-
matter information” (Email 26).
Lakens raised the question of how much the approaches in
this paper are representative of what researchers do in gen-
eral (Email 43 and 44). Wagenmakers’ discussion of p-values
echoes this point. While Lakens describes p-values as a guide
to “deciding to act in a certain way with an acceptable risk of
error” and contends many scientists conform to this rationale
(Email 32), Wagenmakers has a more pessimistic view. In his
experience, the role of p-values is less epistemic than social:
they are used to convince referees and editors and to suggest
that the hypothesis in question is true (Email 37). Also Hennig
disagrees with Lakens, but from a frequentist point of view: p-
values should not guide binary accept/reject-decisions, they just
indicate the degree to which the observed data is compatible
with the model specified by the null hypothesis (Email 34).
The question of how data analysis relates to learning, infer-
ence and decision making was also discussed regarding the
merits (and problems) of Bayesian statistics. Hennig contends
that there can be “some substantial gain from them [priors] only
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if the prior encodes some relevant information that can help the
analysis. However, here we don’t have such information” and
the Bayesian “approach added unnecessary complexity” (Email
23). Wagenmakers reply is that “the prior is not there to help
or hurt an analysis: it is there because without it, the models
do not make predictions; and without making predictions, the
hypotheses or parameters cannot be evaluated” and that “the
approach is more complex, but this is because it includes some
essential ingredients that the classical analysis omits” (Email 24).
In fact, he insinuates that frequentists learn from data through
“Bayes by stealth”: the observed p-values, confidence intervals
and other quantities are used to update the plausibility of the
models in an “inexact and intuitive” way. “Without invoking
Bayes’ rule (by stealth) you can’t learn much from a classical
analysis, at least not in any formal sense.” (Email 24) According
to Hennig, there is more to learning than “updating epistemic
probabilities of certain parameter values being true. For example
I find it informative to learn that ‘Model X is compatible with the
data’ ” (Email 25). However, Wagenmakers considers Hennig’s
example of learning as a synonymous to observing. Though he
agrees that “it is informative to know when a specific model
is or is not compatible with data; to learn anything, however,
by its very definition requires some form of knowledge updat-
ing” (Email 30). This discussion evolved, finally, into a general
discussion about the philosophical principles and ideas under-
lying schools of statistical inference. Ironically, both Lakens
(decision-theoretically oriented frequentism) and Gelman (fal-
sificationist Bayesianism) claim the philosophers of science Karl
Popper and Imre Lakatos, known for their ideas of accumulating
scientific progress through successive falsification attempts, as
one of their primary inspirations, although they spell out their
ideas in a different way (Email 42 and 45).
Hennig and Lakens also devoted some attention to improv-
ing statistical practice and either directly or indirectly ques-
tioned the relevance of foundational debates. Concerning the
above issue with using p-values for binary decision making,
Hennig suspects that “if Bayesian methodology would be in
more widespread use, we’d see the same issue there ... and
then ‘reject’ or ‘accept’ based on whether a posterior proba-
bility is larger than some mechanical cutoff” (Email 34) and
“that much of the controversy about these approaches concerns
naive ‘mechanical’ applications in which formal assumptions
are taken for granted to be fulfilled in reality” (Email 29). In
addition, Lakens points out that
whether you use one approach to statistics or another doesn’t
matter anything in practice. If my entire department would
use a different approach to statistical inferences (now every-
one uses frequentist hypothesis testing) it would have basi-
cally zero impact on their work. However, if they would learn
how to better use statistics, and apply it in a more thoughtful
manner, a lot would be gained. (Email 32)
Homer provides an apt conclusion to this topic by stating “I
think a lot of problems with research happen long before statis-
tics get involved. E.g. Issues with measurement; samples and/or
methods that can’t answer the research question; untrained or
poor observers” (Email 35).
Finally, an interesting distinction was made between a pre-
scriptive use of statistics and a more pragmatic use of statistics.
As an illustration of the latter, Hennig has a more pragmatic
perspective on statistics, because a strong prescriptive view (i.e.,
fulfillment of modeling assumptions as a strict requirement
for statistical inference) would often mean that we can’t do
anything in practice (Email 2). To clarify this point, he adds:
“Model assumptions are never literally fulfilled so the question
cannot be whether they are..., but rather whether there is infor-
mation or features of the data that will mislead the methods
that we want to apply” (Email 23). The former is illustrated by
Homer:
I think that assumptions are critically important in statistical
analysis. Statistical assumptions are the axioms which allow
a flow of mathematical logic to lead to a statistical inference.
There is some wiggle roomwhen it comes to things like ‘how
robust is this test, which assumes normality, to skew?’ but you
are on far safer ground when all the assumptions are/appear
to be met. I personally think that not even checking the
plausibility of assumptions is inexcusable sloppiness (not that
I feel anyone here suggested otherwise). (Email 11)
From what has been said in the discussion, there is general
consensus that not all assumptions need to be met and not
all rules need to be strictly followed. However, there is great
disagreement about which assumptions are important; which
rules should be followed and how strictly; and what can be
interpreted from the results when (it is uncertain if) these rules
and assumptions are violated. The interesting subtleties of this
topic and the discussants’ views on use of statistics can be read
in the online supplement (model assumptions: Email 4, 11,
23, and 24; alpha-levels, p-values, Bayes factors, and decision
procedures: Email 2, 9, 11, 14, 15, 24, and 31–40; sampling plan,
optional stopping, and conditioning on the data: Email 2, 5–11,
16–18, 23, and 24).
In summary, dissimilar methods were used that resulted in
similar conclusions and varying views were discussed on how
statistical methods are used and should be used. At times it
was a heated debate with interesting arguments from both (or
more) sides. As onemight expect, there was disagreement about
particularities of procedures and consensus on the expectation
that scientific practice would be improved by better general
education on the use of statistics.
5. Closing Remarks
Four teams each analyzed two published datasets. Despite sub-
stantial variation in the statistical approaches employed, all
teams agreed that it would be premature to draw strong conclu-
sions from either of the datasets. Adding to this cautious attitude
are concerns about the nature of the data. For instance, the first
dataset was observational, and the second dataset may require
a correction for multiplicity. In addition, for each scenario, the
research teams indicated that more background information
was desired; for instance, “when is the difference in birth defects
considered too small tomatter?”; “what are the effects for similar
drugs?”; “is the correlation selective to the amygdala?”; and
“what is the prior distribution for the correlation?”. Unfortu-
nately, in the routine use of statistical procedures such informa-
tion is provided only rarely.
338 N. N. N. VAN DONGEN ET AL.
It also became evident that the analysis teams not only
needed to make assumptions about the nature of the data and
any relevant background knowledge, but they also needed to
interpret the research question. For the first dataset, for instance,
the question was formulated as “Is cetirizine exposure during
pregnancy associated with a higher incidence of birth defects?”.
What the original researchers wanted to know, however, is
whether or not cetirizine is safe—this more general question
opens up the possibility of applying alternative approaches, such
as the equivalence test, or even a statistical decision analysis:
should pregnant women be advised not to take cetirizine? We
purposefully tried to steer clear from decision analyses because
the context-dependent specification of utilities adds another
layer of complexity and requires even more background knowl-
edge than was already demanded for the present approaches.
More generally, the formulation of our research questions was
susceptible to multiple interpretation: as tests against a point
null, as tests of direction, or as tests of effect size. The goals
of a statistical analysis can be many, and it is important to
define themunambiguously—again, the routine use of statistical
procedures almost never conveys this information.
Despite the (unfortunately near-universal) ambiguity about
the nature of the data, the background knowledge, and the
research question, each analysis team added valuable insights
and ideas. This reinforces the idea that a careful statistical anal-
ysis, even for the simplest of scenarios, requires more than a
mechanical application of a set of rules; a careful analysis is
a process that involves both skepticism and creativity. Perhaps
popular opinion is correct, and statistics is difficult. On the other
hand, despite employing widely different approaches, all teams
nevertheless arrived at a similar conclusion. This tentatively
supports the Fisher–Jeffreys conjecture that, regardless of the
statistical framework in which they operate, careful analysts will
often come to similar conclusions.
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